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The Sign and 
Its Alterity 
Eugenia Paulicelli 
In this essay I refer to the following works of Augusto Ponzio: Spostamenti: 
Percorsi e Discorsi sul Segno, Bari: Adriatica, 1982; Lo Spreco dei Significanti: /'Eros, 
la Morte, la Scrittura, Bari: Adriatica, 1983; Soggetto e Alteritii a Levinas, Bari: 
Adriatica, 1983; Tra Linguaggio e Letteratura, Bari: Adriatica, 1983; Per Par/are dei 
Segni/Talking about Signs, Bari: Adriatica, 1985; Filosofia de/ Linguaggio, Bari: Adriatica, 
1985; "On the Methodics of Common Speech," Differentia 1, 1986, pp . 136-66; 
Interpretazione e Scrittura, Verona: Bertani, 1986; Rossi-Landi e La Filosofia del Lin-
guaggio, Bari: Adriatica, 1988. 
The notion of sign, particularly the "verbal sign," seems to 
be a theoretical problem which leads to different tendencies in a 
discipline such as semiotics. Signs are vehicles which establish 
the relationship between man and the world, conceived not only 
on a communicative level or by an exchange of data and meaning, 
but as a continual process of semiotization or interpretation 
(Peirce) as well. The interpretation intended as a method sometimes 
is revealed as an obstacle by the open process of interpretation 
itself. The human subject is himself a texture of signs, through 
which he interprets the world and renders the signs capable of 
signifying, or comprehending, the relationship between the 
"knowing subject" and "different objects"-known and un-
known. 
In Peircean terms, man is an open chain of signs and interpre-
tants, or more precisely, man gives rise to thought. Thought itself 
is a sign, and life itself is "a train of thought"; consequently, man 
is a sign. Peirce establishes a very close link between language, 
man and thought. Thus we can argue that there is a very strong 
link between the concept of the human subject and that of the sign. 
On the one hand we have a sign, which is conceived of as 
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the identity or correspondence between what it "represents" and 
the object itself (in a one-to-one relation). This is generally referred 
to as the semiotics of Saussurean derivation, in which the sign is 
composed of a signifie and a signifiant, and their relation is one of 
"equal exchange." On the other hand, Peirce's semiotics of in-
terpretation implies an open-ended chain of interpretants. The 
dichotomy between signifier and signified is replaced by a relation-
ship between object, sign and interpretant. From this concept of 
sign there emerges, at the different stages of interpretation (Iconic-
ity, Indexicality and Symbolicity) an elaborate conception of the 
nature of hypothesis or" abduction," which gives further openness 
to the act of interpretation. 
These dynamic acts are not related to a mere process of decod-
ing a message, because this method implies that a pre-established 
reality or "apriori" data exist, and our role is relegated to discov-
ering these presumed hidden data. This kind of discourse helps 
to establish and maintain a certain law or rule for the social repro-
duction of a values system by a given society without discussing 
them. 
We must recall that Saussurean semiotics engenders certain 
mechanical devices which do not overcome a restricted notion of 
the sign and of the human subject. As Augusto Ponzio has argued 
in several studies on Peirce, Bachtin, Vailati and Rossi-Landi, 
those approaches cannot go beyond "decodification" and the re-
production of a pre-established symbolic universe. Furthermore, 
the semiotics of the code excludes, or does not consider, those 
aspects of the sign-such as plurivocality and semantic am-
biguity-which aim at recovering the conception of alterity, within 
the constitution of the sign. This establishes an innovative aspect 
of the sign because it actually modifies the very model of the sign 
itself. Ponzio has stressed and analyzed this topic of the sign and 
its alterity in various studies, which belong not only to the fields 
of semiotics and philosophy of language, but to literary criticism 
as well . 
Ponzio' s work could be described as a crossroads between 
two separate but interrelated routes. One belongs to the field of 
philosophy of language, or more precisely of "languages" and 
semiotics, and the other recovers "l' espace litteraire" as the text 
par excellence, where the notion of alterity is highly represented. 
These two trajectories establish a dynamic act which inscribes 
itself into interpretive practice. A theoretical practice should enable 
the subject-interpretant to evaluate a text from different perspec-
tives. This is part of what Ponzio describes as "spostamenti." "Spos-
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tamenti" is in fact the title of one of Ponzio' s books, which suggests 
the "displacement" of the self in the chain of semiosis from one 
interpretant to another. This becomes evident in other studies on 
the language of philosophy and in the book on Levinas. 
In one of his more recent studies, Rossi-Landi e la Filosofia del 
Linguaggio (1988), Ponzio appropriates Rossi-Landi's concept of 
"extrasign residual"-a concept which relates to ideology and so-
cial reproduction, and which he brings to bear on the literary 
field. He recognizes the letterarieta ["literariness"] of a text, which 
constitutes the residue of the ideological interpretation of the liter-
ary text. That is to say that the critical interpretation of ideology 
does not fully explain or exhaust the letterarieta of particular texts. 
Beyond this concept of letterarieta, what is crucial in Ponzio's 
research is, first, the notion of the sign and its alterity, and second, 
the pragmatic implications of that notion in the dynamics of in-
terpretation. For Ponzio, the development of this line of research 
is important in such authors as Peirce, Victoria Welby, Giovanni 
Vailati, Bachtin and Levinas. Ponzio's studies demonstrate how 
these authors place the conception of the sign within the context 
of a dialogical relationship. 
Beginning with his theoretical perspective and developing it 
on the ground of semiosis, Ponzio has recently theorized what 
he calls "ethosemiotics" (in Welby 1985): 
With specific reference to this nonsectorial conception of signs as 
inaugurated by Peirce, and by contrast with semiotics viewed solely 
as a theory of knowledge, it has been suggested that we use the 
term ethosemiotics. 1 
"Ethosemiotics" represents expresses the combination of the study 
of significance with its ethical and pragmatic implications. In ad-
dition to this, and on a broader level, we may say that ethosemio-
tics links dialogically two disciplines in a very subtle way-
philosophy of language and semiotics. 
Despite their differences, there is a very close link between 
Welby's signifies and Ponzio's "ethosemiotics." Victoria Welby 
(1837-1912), in developing her theory of "signifies," was also con-
cerned with terminological exactitude. Signifies is the term she 
used in order to designate the connection between the notions of 
sign, sense and meaning. "Signifies" is a theory of significance, 
but also of "signifying," because it implies the mutable characteris-
tic of the sign itself. 
Such a framework, with its overt, interpretive practice, forms 
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a theoretical grid for further studies, not only in the field of semio-
tics but in different realms of human thought. Literature, espe-
cially in its most innovative expressions, is certainly one of these. 
But literature can also represent the site where words collide, 
sometimes in what appears to be a random manner. If, echoing 
Wittgenstein, our world is the language we speak-one which is 
"a chaotic turmoil of events and accidents" -how can one sustain 
an idea of a language that mirrors the world? Unless, as in liter-
ature and the arts, there is a word which expresses in its very 
form this kind of discrepancy or "maladie" (e.g., Joyce, Kafka, 
Calvino). 
At this point a problematic question arises: Can a theory of 
signs, with its overt and dynamical interpretation, fill the gap 
between language and the interrelated forms of knowledge? More 
precisely, I am referring to the fields of literature (and so to the 
knowledge of literature). 
One of Ponzio' s responses to this theoretical "knot" is con-
tained in Lo Spreco dei Signifcanti-l'Eros, la Marte, la Scrittura 
(1983), 2 and since then in further studies such as Tra Linguaggio 
e Letteratura (1984) and Interpretazione e Scrittura; Scienza dei Segni 
ed Eccedenza Letteraria (1986). One of the main objectives of the 
first study is the absence of method, or of debate on that method, 
and its implications for the constitution of the signified. He takes 
up the notions of "depense" (Bataille) and the "excedent sense" 
(Barthes) within the literary word, which convey a sort of primacy 
of the signifier, or at least a primacy of the realm of "significance." 
This perspective commits the critic in a way which is different 
from a Peircean semiotics of interpretation. Ponzio, in fact, in 
describing the semiotics of writing or "significance," considers 
literature a "field" or a universe of discourse completely autono-
mous from other kinds of discourses. The conception of autonomy 
is also used to overthrow the inner logic of the political discourse-
where the aim of language is to convince someone of something. 
In letterarite there is no end even when the language of everyday 
speech is employed. The letterarite sometimes defines itself in the 
lack of "meaning" or a precise end. The history of literature gives 
us several exemplars of this perspective. 
One of the projects developed in the critical discourse of Pon-
zio' s Lo Spreco dei Significanti was the author's commitment to the 
practice of "writing" (ecriture) aimed not only at clarifying or exp-
laining the ambiguity of the analyzed texts, but also at establishing 
a relationship of "alterity" with them. 
What does the term "alterity" imply in this context? First, one 
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must recognize that the "interpretant subject" is not a kind of 
subject whose knowledge is situated beyond any given text. 
Rather, that subject inscribes himself within the text even as he 
differs from it. The former belongs to literature and the latter 
belongs to the field of criticism. Traditionally, literary critics have 
nevertheless restricted themselves to the understanding and sys-
tematization of texts which resist any tidy ordering principle (e.g., 
avant-garde texts). 
At this point, another obstacle seems to appear on the in-
terpretive scene . There is the danger of running two theoretical 
risks. First, such textual disorder may not be possible to com-
prehend fully. As a result, one could impose a "grammar of dis-
order" on it. This, however, is a contradiction in terms because 
it asserts a law of disorder. Second, if a "scientific" method (semio-
tics, etc.) requires a particular end, how can it be employed in 
interpreting a literary text without lying to itself or allowing the 
text to lie to itself? This seems to me an open question because 
of the irreducible alterity of literature with regard to the so-called 
exact science and rigorous sciences. 
One of the problematic responses, which is not to be intended 
as a "solution" to the question, is, as Ponzio shows, that to main-
tain the category of alterity within the sign is to ascribe the notion 
of alterity to man himself (pace the Peircean idea that "man is a 
sign"). 
Ponzio in Rossi-Landi e la Filosofia del Linguaggio recalls Umberto 
Eco's observation (in "L'Ultima Soglia della Semiotica") that there 
is always a close link between the conception of the sign and the 
conception of the human subject. This very fragile and crucial 
relationship is inevitable and its precise trace is in the very act of 
writing [ecriture]. It is an act which underscores the chaos, and in 
which both the critic and the writer are involved. Yet both employ 
language in such different ways that they try to give shape to the 
chaos of the world. Moreover, that very act of shaping expresses 
this disorder or absence of form. As Calvino once said, the "lack 
of substance is not to be found in images or in languages alone, 
but in the world itself . "3 The ongoing conflict for language is 
whether the word can capture exactly what evades the language 
itself and its rules. But this is a very old battle, and its solution 
has yet to be discovered. 
I think that the supremacy of signifiers in the use of the 
discourse of literary criticism should not be maintained as the 
only tool in reading a text. One must not conceive of alterity as 
being external to the concept of sign and to the process of semiosis; 
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it resides within the interpretive dynamics. 
What is extremely important from a theoretical perspective, 
and with regard to the question of method as well, is what Ponzio 
has called the "self-sufficiency" [autosufficenza] of the abductive 
interpretant. 4 It is exactly this connotation of Peircean semiotics 
which presents a challenge and provocation to the fixed law of 
identity. In doing so, one undermines the logic of binarism, or 
dichotomy (true/false, identical/diverse), and recovers the notion 
of alterity, which enables us to overcome and to shift the preexist-
ing object of analysis. 
1. Susan Petrilli, Signifies, Semiotica, Significazione (Bari: Adriatica, 1988), 130. 
2. Which this author cowrote with him. 
3. Italo Calvino, Six Memos for the Next Millennium (Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 1987), 57. 
4. In "Abduction and Alterity," Versus 34 (January-April 1983). 
